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1 - Introduction 
 
The European societies are currently characterized by phenomena (such as 
globalization, multiculturalism and ethical relativism) which, besides being 
able to change the traditional manifestations of religion and, consequently, 
the organization of national legal systems, can also modify the 
intersubjective relations (between individuals and collective subjects) 
within the same social systems. This affects the known mechanisms of 
regulation of religious freedom, to the point that, often, they show elements 
of weakness together with evolutionary lines.  
After all, multiculturalism is one of those phenomena that, even 
when it is supposed to be known in its constitutive profiles, shows rapid 
modifications and variety of contents, which impose not easy adaptation 
processes1. 
                                                          
* Il contributo, sottoposto a valutazione, riproduce, con l’aggiunta delle note, il testo 
dell’intervento alla 6ª edizione dell’International Summer School dei corsi di Scienze Politiche 
sul tema “The Making of Europe: social and intercultural integration, legal issues and local 
development”, organizzata dall’Università degli Studi del Molise (Agnone, IS, 19 luglio 
2018). 
 
1 Multiculturalism, understood as a political project that provides a space for the 
affirmation and protection of the rights of every ideal community (alongside the protection 
of individual rights), has met, over time, a significant change from its original formulation. 
Since its first manifestation in the seventies to the thunderous explosion in the eighties and 
nineties of the last century, multiculturalism has undergone continuous mutations. This is 
due to the necessity of having to confront, gradually, with increasingly different and 
demanding questions, imposed by the changing of the social contexts of reference. This 
situation has made the identification of individual ideal differences much less complex 
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In this regard, it is worth reflecting (albeit briefly) on the significance 
of multiculturalism and multireligiosity in their evolutionary 
manifestation, with particular regard to the progressive incidence on the 
entity and the thickness of change in the intersubjective relations within our 
socio-juridical system. This is to understand the possible meanings of 
multiculturalism, in an attempt to represent the capacity of the legal system 
in responding to new social needs. 
Multiculturalism and multireligiosity which, in their manifestation 
on a planetary scale, tend to assume also the typical characteristics of 
globalization, are the effect of different and complex social, economic, 
political and juridical phenomena, containing in themselves a polysemic 
value. Precisely, because of their objective and complex nature, it is difficult 
to identify an univocal concept of multiculturalism and multireligiosity, 
imposing its contingency assessment in relation to the chosen speculative 
sphere2. 
What interests us, specifically, is the juridical notion of 
multiculturalism, identified on the basis of the changed function of law in 
the contemporary society. Through the law, the relationships between the 
different (social, political and institutional) subjects and between the 
different cultures (also religious ones) are regulated and articulated. Thus, 
the multiculturalism that is taken into consideration is the phenomenon that 
tends not only to register differences, but also to govern them, recognizing 
that they constitute a value in themselves, which is not weakened by the 
persistence of (social, cultural, legal, religious, economic) conflicts or 
difficulties in the integration processes3. Integrating otherness is a 
phenomenon that belongs to social and juridical dynamics, activated as 
concrete manifestations of a community organization that is recognized in 
                                                          
than the substantial affirmation of the equal dignity of any cultural identity, which has 
come to depend on the commitment of the public authorities to satisfy, effectively and 
fairly, all the requirements of identity visibility. See E. CANIGLIA, L’Europa e il 
multiculturalismo, in Società mutamento politica, 2010, 1, pp. 127-142.  
2 P. VERONESI, Diritti costituzionali e multiculturalismo, in Diritto e società, 2012, 1, pp. 
19-54.  
3 Therefore, the objective to pursue is the search for shared legal values, without, 
however, distorting the identification profiles of each belief and any ideal orientation. The 
constitutional dynamics should allow the preparation of appropriate regulations to meet 
the needs of minority groups, avoiding the continuous tendency to adopt laws that are 
culturally oriented to respond to the needs of the dominant spiritual groups, even if they 
are conformed to the constitutional dictate. See A. FUCCILLO, La multireligiosità tra 
possibile “normazione” ed ipotetica “autonormazione”, in A. Fuccillo (ed.), Multireligiosità e 
reazione giuridica, Giappichelli, Torino, 2008, pp. 280-281.  
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its evolutionary dimension. In this perspective, the recognition of otherness 
and of the different traditional and religious heritages, belonging to the 
many cultural communities that cohabit - for historical and political destiny 
- in the same territories, becomes an unavoidable political act for a social 
system. Especially when the social arrangements are in search of the rules 
on which, on the one hand, to orient the cohabitation between the different 
subjects and, on the other, to get the reconciliation between individual 
rights and collective rights4. 
The challenge to the liberal and democratic systems is based on the 
critical review of many previous legal and conceptual categories. Above all 
because those same categories appear to be the result of an overcome 
cultural and religious homogeneity, which is questioned by the profound 
social changes taking place5. The elaboration of juridical rules, capable of 
enhancing differences, appears to be the main way to govern in a successful 
way the multicultural societies.  
The multicultural and multireligious society must be able to prepare 
the instruments necessary to ensure a widespread development, the growth 
of the country and the mutual enrichment of all the social components, 
while transiting through a phase of conflict. The conscious awareness of 
one's own cultural identity and of the characteristics of diversity, 
                                                          
4 In essence, democracy and pluralism, as structural elements of the political 
organization of a society, presuppose, above all, the need to define the rules of cohesion 
and compatibility of social diversity. In the field of religious experience, the principles of 
neutrality and non-identification of the state are worth, in fact, to recognize the 
differentiation of options of faith. Those principles are valid to ensure that the comparison 
between the different religious components and the satisfaction of their interests could take 
place in compliance with the cohesive values of reference. In fact, the transition from a 
pluralistic society, from the religious point of view, to a multicultural society, proposes life 
models, behavioral forms and relational schemes not united by substantial basic affinities. 
We are faced with strong and opposing identities, which, as such, present themselves for 
being difficult to negotiate. Thus, multiculturalism seems to question the foundations of 
the democratic government of the plural society: compatibility and negotiability of the 
interests at stake. It is therefore up to the constitutional principles of equality, freedom, 
neutrality and non-identification to operate as an instrument for rationalizing the 
confrontation between the different ways of being of faith. See A. FUCCILLO, Il diritto 
ecclesiastico come “diritto vivente” nella esperienza giuridica contemporanea, in M. Tedeschi 
(ed.), Il riformismo legislativo in diritto ecclesiastico e canonico, Luigi Pellegrini Editore, 
Cosenza, 2011, pp. 414-415; I. VECCHIO CAIRONE, Democrazie in crisi e credenze di fede, in 
G. D’Angelo, G. Fauceglia (ed.), Rigore e curiosità. Scritti in memoria di Maria Cristina Folliero, 
Giappichelli, Torino, 2018, pp. 753-754.  
5 See S. FERLITO, Società multireligiosa e interpretazione normativa, in A. Fuccillo (ed.), 
Multireligiosità e reazione giuridica, cit., p. 156.  
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constituting the elements of recognition of one's specificity, allows the 
individual components of the social system to experience the change of 
legal structures and to understand the development of political, economic 
and cultural dynamics in a logic of solidarity and perception of one's own 
protagonism. It follows that the thematic area of religion/law is the most 
effective strategic place from which to face the complex problems raised by 
the coexistence of differences.  
The relationship with ethnic, ethical, cultural and spiritual diversity 
is increasingly a field of tension between politics and religion, between State 
and Churches6. Thus, the approaches to multicultural society, the 
relationship with globalization, the debate on multiculturalism are felt and 
interpreted as a test of the ability of the Churches to speak to the Italian civil 
society and its institutions7. The government of a multicultural society 
became a question of ecclesiastical politics and of relations between the 
State and the Churches. The discussion on the accommodation models (the 
assimilationist, the communitarist and the integrationist one) – with all its 
stereotypes - is no longer limited to the mere immigration policies. It is now 
a question of an overall issue that involves the relationship between ethics 
and politics, the identity of the country and the State, the concept of 
secularism, the global framework of relations between religions and public 
institutions.  
 
 
                                                          
6 The stable establishment of new ethnic communities, following the migratory flows 
coming from geographically and culturally distant areas of the world, proposes many new 
cultural and religious models to the attention of the host society. We are faced with a real 
change in the 'religious market', destined, due to the production of new social identities in 
terms of the experience of faith, to increase, in the contemporary democratic society, the 
differences. An accentuation of the complexity of the social structure is determined, thus 
contributing to test the procedural and substantive paths of the democratic State. See I. 
VECCHIO CAIRONE, La dimensione nazionale del diritto ecclesiastico: percorsi evolutivi, in G. 
D'ANGELO, Ordinamenti giuridici e interessi religiosi. Argomenti di diritto ecclesiastico 
comparato e multilivello, Giappichelli, Torino, 2017, pp. 59-60.  
7 In this respect, it should be noted that the public authorities themselves discount a 
deficit in terms of vision, tools and policies, due to the prevalence of the expansion of 
private subjects over public ones. It is the affirmation of subsidiarity, in which the role of 
the catholic tradition and voluntary service is exalted. A role that is considered to be 
indispensable in the current political and social framework. See M. VENTURA, Stato e 
Chiese nel governo della società multiculturale, in R. De Vita, F. Berti, L. Nasi (ed.), Ugualmente 
diversi. Culture, religioni, diritti, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2007, pp. 53-54.  
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2 - Constitutional project of ecclesiastical politics and cultural resistance 
to a correct interpretation of the fundamental provisions of freedom 
 
The phenomenon of immigration to Italy of people coming from the 
Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan African countries is causing significant 
changes in the previous social structure. This is both for the economic costs 
and for the media impact on public opinion of the sea rescue and first 
reception policies (fixed by Mare Nostrum, Triton and Sophia operations, 
only partially financed by the European Union). But it is also for the space 
that is occupied by immigrants in the less qualified working areas (in 
particular, the reference goes to the sectors of construction, agriculture, 
services and industry, as neglected ones by the native workers8). 
Furthermore, another important argument is the diversity of cultures and 
life habits of migrants, presenting aspects that are not always fully 
compatible with customs, traditional sociality and legal principles of our 
country9. 
This intense multicultural and multireligious character of our 
contemporary society offers the opportunity to reflect on the continuing 
existence of limits, defaults and shortcomings in the full and correct 
implementation of the Constitution and its project of religious policy, as 
well as to suggest solutions and proposals to satisfy all the social religious 
needs. The representation of the civil regulation of religion and, 
consequently, the political, legislative and administrative activities seem to 
be based primarily on the relationship between religious denominations 
and the State. This in a logic for which the concrete religious needs of the 
people and the requests addressed to the public powers are relegated to a 
residual role, as possibly recipients of the outcomes of those relationships. 
That is, it seems to be in front of the continuous representation, as forms of 
                                                          
8 On these topics see M. SAVINO, L’Italia, l’Unione Europea e la crisi migratoria, in Il 
Mulino, 2/2017, pp. 273-283.  
9 As it is imaginable, this is particularly true for muslim immigrants, linked to a 
religious and cultural system that has difficulty in relating to modernity and achieving a 
guarantee of compatibility with western democratic values. The strangeness of the islamic 
world to our system of life is highlighted not only by the difficulty of sharing some basic 
values, but also by the consequent lack of aptitude for integration. This has meant that the 
islamic immigrant has become a witness of diversity, because the religious issues have 
been accompanied by social exclusion and by the emphasis on respect for religious 
precepts as an emblem of the rejected social identity. See G.B. VARNIER, Religione e 
nazione. Le coordinate del sistema italiano, in G.B. Varnier (ed.), Fattore religioso, ordinamenti e 
identità nazionale nell’Italia che cambia, Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere, Genova, 2014, 
pp. 146-150.  
 6 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 32 del 2018 ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
satisfaction of the religious freedom, of the favorable regime, of the 
privileges that the bilateral regulations grant to the dominant religious 
groups.  
A system of ecclesiastical relations of a pyramidal nature has been 
established in Italy. A model in which the more politically authoritative 
religion, that is the Catholic Church, has obtained a doubly privileged 
status: in the form, because it is guaranteed by the Constitution and by the 
international law); in the content, because it recognizes significant benefits 
for the Church of Rome, starting, for example, from the teaching of religion 
in the public schools); benfits that are denied, in terms of their specific 
weight of benefits, to any other religious organization. Other Churches, 
admitted to stipulate agreements with the State, have obtained a worse 
statute than that of the Catholic Church, but better than that of the religions 
without any pact with the public institutions. Then, an unknown number 
of religious organizations is recognized as such, but it enjoys limited rights, 
provided for by a unilateral law of the state (the famous law n. 1159 of 1929 
on the ‘admitted cults to the State’), inherited from the Fascist age . At the 
bottom of the pyramid, finally, we can find all those religious groups that, 
for different reasons, are not recognized as religious denominations from 
the State and, consequently, live in anonymity, without specifics and special 
regulatory protections. It is clear that this hierarchical structure is offered to 
the political objective to reward the strongest and socially reassuring 
confessional subjects, selected in a non-respectful way of a rigorous 
application of the principle of equality, of the impartiality of public powers 
with respect to all beliefs and religious institutions, of the freedom of some 
specific religious groups10. In essence, in Italy there is a rewarding and 
selective system of ecclesiastical relations, which, as interpreted and 
implemented, is not extended to the religious groups that have appeared 
on the social scene in the last thirty years. A system that strongly conditions 
the public authorities when they have to elaborate an 'identikit' to identify 
the interlocutors with whom to establish the type of relationships that has 
been constitutionally foreseen11. This is the case of Islam, which enjoys a 
                                                          
10 See M. VENTURA, Un diritto per il fenomeno religioso. Strumenti e idee in un nuovo 
contesto, in R. De Vita, F. Berti (ed.), Pluralismo religioso e convivenza multiculturale. Un dialogo 
necessario, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2003, p. 475.  
11 See M.C. FOLLIERO, Costi e benefici e varianti dell’attuale sistema costituzionale di 
collegamento con le religioni. Esempi, in V.Tozzi, G. Macrì (ed.), Europa e Islam. Ridiscutere i 
fondamenti della disciplina delle libertà religiose, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2009, p. 45.  
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strong social following, but it is still considered not adaptable to the legal 
format of religious denomination12.  
In reality, we are in front of an approach that is directly a 
consequence of a fundamental misunderstanding of the current 
institutional framework. 
The interventions of the public authorities (implemented through the 
legislative instrument, characterized by their financial nature or by their 
conferring a specific guaranty of freedom) only in rare cases have appeared 
based on the actual existence of widespread interests. They have been, 
mostly, provided for the benefit of certain religious denominations. This is 
because the religious groups have proved capable of exercising a fair 
influence on political power, succeeding in presenting themselves to the 
public institutions as legitimate representatives of all religious social 
interests, and not of a mere portion of them, as it is in the concrete reality of 
the dynamism of the religious phenomenon13. 
The most reprehensible aspect of this way of operating, however, 
seems to be constituted by the exasperated recourse to the bilateral 
legislation. In fact, the excessive use of bilaterally agreed legislation, in 
order to satisfy the requests made by the religious groups, has led to the 
unfortunate consequence that the ordinary and unilateral legislation 
concerning religious interests has been produced and interpreted, at least 
until today, as an appendix of the norms contracted with the religious 
denominations.  
                                                          
12 The legal status currently experienced by italian Islam is the classic example of the 
tendency to keep under observation the cohesive and ordering capacities of religions in 
immigrant communities, in order to contain their supposed and potential social 
antagonism. In the end, the overall and proven ability of a community of immigrants to fit 
into a framework of common rules of cohabitation appears to be the primary condition for 
integration and acceptance (and, therefore, for the enjoyment of religious freedom). See 
M.C. FOLLIERO, Libertà religiosa e società multiculturali: la risposta italiana, in M.L. Tacelli, 
V. Turchi (ed.), Studi in onore di Piero Pellegrino. Scritti di diritto canonico ed ecclesiastico, vol. 
I, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli, 2009, p. 618.  
13 The religious denominations, even if they are socially relevant because instrumental 
to the satisfaction of the religious needs of their followers, are bearers of partisan interests. 
Therefore, they cannot assume the role of general guarantors of religious freedom in their 
relations with the public institutions, because they represent only a part of the wide 
universe of the religious phenomenon. Precisely for this reason, the religious 
denominations cannot claim to be constituted in the public civil space as subjects carrying 
universal values, pretending that their values are established as mandatory rules for all. 
See V. TOZZI, Dimensione pubblica del fenomeno religioso e collaborazione delle confessioni 
religiose con lo Stato, in R. Coppola, C. Ventrella (ed.), Laicità e dimensione pubblica del fattore 
religioso. Stato attuale e prospettive, Cacucci Editore, Bari, 2012, p. 233.  
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This situation also seems to be due to the cultural and juridical 
resistance linked to the full overcoming of the previous model (dating back 
to the Fascist era) of relations between citizens and public powers. A model 
based on the system of 'reflex rights', involving the supremacy of public 
institutions and the exercise of a careful police control on the needs of 
individuals, for which the direct protection of the rights of the human 
person was recessive and subordinate to the protection of the needs of 
organized forms of religiosity, with absolute priority for those needs14.  
In reality, the current constitutional provisions suggest an 
interpretation of the whole of the fundamental Charter norms concerning 
the religious phenomenon as instrumental to the promotion of the 
personalistic principle, understood as the foundation of the unifying pact 
the national society around the institutions of the State, without gender, 
cultural, social and religious distinction. Bearing in mind that the true object 
of the public dimension of the religious phenomenon must be considered 
to be the religiousness as human behavior, that is beneficiary of primary 
constitutional protection, and not the power of the dominant religious 
groups, it should be up to the unilateral State legislation the task of giving 
regulation to the individual and collective right of religious faith. Starting 
from this basic vision, it would be possible to identify, in harmony with the 
spirit of the Constitutional Charter, the most correct method through which 
to evaluate the relations, object of the contracted legislation, with the most 
present and rooted religious groups in our society.  
                                                          
14 A legislation that, approved in a neoconfessionist perspective, supports an indirect 
protection of the freedom of faith, thus favoring some religious organizations and not 
others. It could be enough to consider the requirements to which, pursuant to art. 3 of the 
law n. 1159 of 1929 and of the articles 20-21 of the Royal Decree n. 289 of 1930, the approval 
of the provision of legal recognition of the appointments of non-Catholic ministers is 
subject to approval. These rules provide that, if “[...] the cult is not, or for the erection of its 
institutions in a moral body or otherwise, already known to the Government”, the instant 
provides information “[...] about the denomination of it, its aims, its rites, the financial 
means of which it disposes, the names of the administrators, the ecclesiastical authority on 
which it depends”. The article. 21 of the aforementioned Royal Decree, then, refers to other, 
compared to those indicated above, “[...] necessary informations to complete the 
investigation”. Informations that must be taken by the territorially competent prefects, 
who transmit the documents to the Ministry of the Interior. As it can be seen, it is only the 
example of a procedure that is coherent with the political situation in which it has been 
devised. Thus, it may well be said that the legislation on the 'admitted cults to the State' is 
expressive of an action of 'ecclesiastical police' aimed at controlling and supervising the 
activities of non-Catholic religious groups, in the fascist logic of the controlled number of 
the religious denominations. See F. ALICINO, La legislazione sulla base di intese. I test delle 
religioni “altre” e degli ateismi, Cacucci Editore, Bari, 2013, pp. 54-57.  
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The prevalence of an interpretation aimed at attributing a specific 
public role to the religious denominations, in an ideal line of continuity with 
the choices operated in the Fascist era15, is considered misleading even with 
respect to the expectations of a reading of the Constitutional Charter in 
harmony with the transformations of the society and with the commitment 
of the institutions to deal with them. In a pluralist and multicultural society, 
based on the primacy of human dignity and on inviolability of the 
fundamental human rights, it must be considered at least eccentric that the 
religious dimension of life is subjected to a civil law regulation according to 
which the spiritual freedoms of the citizens obtain protection mainly 
through the activities of the religious organizations which they can (or not) 
join. The contemporary multiplicity of the religious identity dimensions, all 
constitutionally worthy of protection, requires that the offered standards by 
legal freedoms have to be articulated with reference to the priority needs of 
realization of the individual dignity of the human person. Thus, the 
dynamic character of religious experience, object of attention by the 
Fundamental Charter, cannot subtract individual members from the 
protection given by the State (also, possibly, towards the groups to which 
they can choose to join). 
Indeed, the satisfaction of the inviolable right of religious freedom 
must be considered entrusted with the requirements of the art. 19 of the 
Charter, given that this norm ensures to everyone, individuals and groups, 
the widest profession of faith, with an enhanced warranty potential when 
it is read in connection with the indications of the art. 20, protecting all the 
religious groups by possible social and legal discrimination. Both the 
provisions operate a strong general protection for the concrete 
implementation of the spiritual needs of people and social formations, if 
compared with the specific protection capacity of the religious 
denominations ensured by the articles 7 and 8 of the Constitution. 
Therefore, if religiosity is understood as a human behavior which is 
                                                          
15 It can be enough to think, for example, that in the fascist dictatorial regime, the 
recognition of civil effects to the sacrament of catholic marriage, set by art. 34 of the Lateran 
Concordat, entrusted to Church the task of managing the prevailing part of family 
relationships in Italy according to values and rules elaborated by it (and adopted by the 
fascist-confessionist State). So, the Church realized its own need, the care of souls, the 
assumption of its own values as values of the whole society and, at the same time, played 
the role of a large public agency of social control (the religion of the State). As already 
mentioned above, therefore, the applied model, in the absence of a direct protection of 
citizens' rights, has created a system of rights satisfied only through the intermediation of 
the Church, that is to say under the obedience, control and management of the Catholic 
ecclesiastical institution, erected to the role of public body in the fascist State. 
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instrumental to pursue the constitutional objective of improvement of the 
human person, this purpose appears to be more guaranteed by specific 
provisions, such as the articles 19 and 20, designed to protect individual and 
collective religious freedom.  
With respect to these constitutional reference principles, consistently 
with the true spirit of the Fundamental Charter, it is likely to consider the 
consequent development of the original autonomy of the religious 
denominations and of the bilateral legislation with the major spiritual 
groups. The overall draft of the negotiated law between the State and the 
religious denominations should be returned to the logic that was proposed 
by the Constituent Assembly, as a method of governing relationships - for 
well-defined subjects - between autonomous and independent entities. 
Such relationships should not have any direct impact on civil religious 
rights, but they only should have the aim to realize the specific interests and 
needs of the confessional groups. Interests and needs, in any case, not 
classifiable as general and collective ones, and to be considered as distinct 
from those placeable in the category of the ‘public interests’. Thus, a further 
confirmation is obtained that the individual denominational groups, even 
if recognized as significant interlocutors for the public authorities (due to 
the their generic ability to promote the fulfillment of the spiritual needs of 
the persons), are, however, tending to the achievement of partisan interests 
and, consequently, they would have no title in claiming the function of 
exclusive guarantors of the individual religious freedom of their 
members16.  
                                                          
16 The interests of a religious group, as regards a community, more or less an extensive 
one, but always part of the society considered as a whole, require a representation that is 
an entity capable of expressing their synthesis in the relationships with political authority 
and institutions. A representation, which is normally made up of organs of the 
organization of the group. These representatives objectively interpret the needs of the 
group, but not necessarily those of their individual followers or internal or inferior 
collectives of the group itself. 
In public interventions (aimet at protecting the needs of a collective subject, through 
laws, administrative acts, material or financial supports), the problem of the current 
relationship between the collective interests of the group and the individual ones of the 
individual belonging is always expressed. Indeed, the group to which the individual binds 
can both enuclear a synthesis of the needs manifested from his followers; a synthesis, which 
should be homogeneous of intents and needs. That is, the group can set rules, its own 
values, enucleated from the elite of its government, which could correspond or diverge or 
not coincide with those of its followers. Consequently, on the one hand, the organization 
of collective interests is constitutionally entitled to act as a center of imputation of the 
protections, rights, guarantees, which the system ensures to all social components; on the 
other hand, the attention or acceptance and protection of the needs expressed by these 
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It should also be noted that the tendency to consider the agreements 
with the Catholic Church and other religious denominations as the central 
focus of the constitutional draft on ecclesiastical politics must be considered 
                                                          
collective organizations should never be binding on the individual participant. In this 
sense, we could speak of an instrumentality of the satisfaction given by civil institutions to 
the needs of the groups organized by religious interests; these particular collective needs 
are protected according to the individual interests that make up that organized collectivity.  
It should be noted that the membership in a social formation is the expression of the 
freedom of the individual, who voluntarily shares the organization and the rules of the 
group; a phenomenon that acts as a legitimization of the internal rules that the group gives 
itself. But just the voluntariness of this relationship of belonging relativizes, in front of the 
civil institutions, the internal rules that the particular social formation has given itself. This 
is because the public institutions cannot recognize absolute constraints on these internal 
rules, to the point of treating the innate freedom of the individual to escape from some of 
these rules or the bond of belonging to the group itself. 
It follows that, the civil authority, as guarantor of the common good, can recognize that 
representation of the expressed religious group within the organization of the group itself, 
but it cannot establish it as legal representation, that is as mandatorily inclusive of wills 
and desires of the individual or minor internal groups. The representation of the interests 
of the respective faithfuls by the organs of each religious group, made in the relations with 
the State authority, cannot be that a democratic political representation, that is subject to 
the respect for the freedom of disagreement of the individual or minor internal groups and 
to the preparation of tools for checking the correspondence between the needs represented 
by the religious institution and the different needs. That's why the State authority is obliged 
by the constitutional principles to protect one and the other interests, which are likewise 
protected.  
The obligation to protect a religious denomination or any kind of religious institution 
is born, by constitutional provisions, if and when they have in Italy a social basis of 
reference; moreover, such protection can never come to sanction the legal representation 
of the interests of the respective group followers. If this happens, there would be the 
concealment of the religious rights of the faithfuls, where they do not coincide with those 
of the representative body. 
The flexibility of the relationship of the individual belonging to a group is an empirical 
fact of which the legal system cannot fail to take into account. Therefore, the representation 
of the religious interests of their followers by the organs of the group organization must 
remain as voluntary, that is to say linked to the actual will of the followers themselves. 
Faced with this problem, the representation of interests becomes an important theme that 
the public institutions are called to consider. It is a question of deepening the methods that 
the public institutions must elaborate, the instruments that the legal system must prepare, 
because both categories of interests mentioned here have equal right to consideration and 
protection. See A. FUCCILLO, Superare la sola eguaglianza formale: verso la libertà religiosa 
delle opportunità, in A. Fuccillo (ed.), Le proiezioni civili delle religioni tra libertà e bilateralità. 
Modelli di disciplina giuridica, Editoriale Scientifica, 2017, pp. 60-61; V. TOZZI, Brevi 
riflessioni su appartenenza e rappresentanza. L’attenzione dell’ordinamento statale al rapporto tra 
individui e soggetti collettivi religiosi di appartenenza, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, 
Telematic magazine (www.statoechiese.it), 27/2012, pp. 10-12.  
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not only reductive in a logic of valorization of the ideal diversity deriving 
from contemporary social pluralism, but also negative for having produced 
the tightening of political choices regarding religious freedom in a 
regulatory framework which - as already mentioned before - is not subject 
to the free unilateral modifiability of the State. Indeed, the weight of the 
constitutional coverage of the bilateral regulations, qualified as sources of 
atypical production, has made these provisions as not amendable by the 
Parliament, and, subsequently, as not modifiable by ordinary law without 
prior consultation of the ecclesiastical counterpart. Furthermore, the 
contractual regulations are not subject to an abrogative referendum, but 
they can be considered only subject to the screening of constitutional 
legitimacy on the basis of the parameter of the supreme principles of the 
legal system17. This has determined the outcome of an endless 
crystallization of the normative data, where, instead, the dynamism, the 
variability and the heterogeneity of the social framework would require 
legislative regulations able to be more flexible and open to the reception of 
the identity requests actually felt by the citizens, on the one hand, and the 
newly emerged spiritual needs, on the other18. 
                                                          
17 This is an interpreting strand that has characterized the constitutional jurisprudence 
in ecclesiastical matters, starting from the second half of the Seventies of the last century. 
With the sentence n. 16 of 2 February 1978, the Constitutional Court declared inadmissible 
the request for a referendum for the repeal of the art. 1 of the law 27 May 1929 n. 810, in 
the parts concerning the entire Concordat and several articles of the Lateran Treaty. This is 
because the proposal for an abrogative referendum would have been directed against a 
normative act similar to the constitutional provisions, both in terms of its peculiar passive 
force (which makes it insurmountable to be validly repealed by subsequent ordinary laws), 
and because it is comparable to an authorization law to ratify international treaties. Thus, 
for the constitutional judges, the bilalterally agreed derivation provisions, even if they do 
not have the active force to deny the supreme principles of the constitutional order, are 
considered similar to the constitutional regulations in terms of passive force or resistance 
to repeal. For more information on these guidelines of constitutional jurisprudence, see A. 
ALBISETTI, Il diritto ecclesiastico nella giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale, Giuffrè, 
Milano, 2014, pp. 29-31 
18 The pluralistic and multireligious character of contemporary society implies, of 
necessity, a flexible use of the normative instrument. That is, the law will have to 
demonstrate adaptability to the non-homogeneous reality that surrounds it, and this will 
be valid both for the interpreter of the norm within the religious communities and within 
the political ones. Both will have to take into account, for the purposes of the common 
objective of cohabitation, to adapt their regulatory frameworks to the dimension of 
flexibility, particularity and concreteness. More specifically with renard to civil legislation, 
this will not mean renouncing the homogeneity of the regulatory system, but rather 
avoiding the risk that the uniformity and rigidity of legal rules may suffocate the identity 
of individual religious, ethnic and cultural communities. See S. BERLINGÒ, Mediazione e 
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It seems appropriate not to forget, moreover, that, in the 
configuration being assumed by the bilateral coordination, the needs of 
enhancing cultural and religious pluralism appear to be mortified by an 
excessive repetitiveness of the contents, initially entrusted to the unilateral 
legislation of the State and now constituting the main part of the concluded 
agreements. Along the lines of what already widely recognized in the 1984 
agreements with the Catholic Church, the generality of the pacts between 
the State and the other religious denominations presents features of strong 
internal homogeneity. This is the natural outcome of a degeneration of the 
contractual system, deriving from its use not as a mean for the normative 
specification of the confessional differences, but as a mean of flattening 
religious groups on the model of the particular relations between the State 
and the Catholic Church19.  
Furthermore, it should also be noted how, in the transformation of 
the social framework of reference, the presence of religious cultures and 
faiths originated from political-institutional experiences that do not accept 
the distinction between religious faith and civilian powers, has made 
difficult the application of the logic of the ‘different statutes’ presupposed 
by the bilateral agreements method. With regard to these groups, however 
well rooted in the italian economic and social reality, it seemed 
inappropriate the application of the method of relations between 
autonomous systems; this is not so much due to the fact that the doctrinal 
heritage, that is followed by them, do not present characters of assimilable 
originality to those of Western-based religions, but because of their 
difficulty to hypothesize a religious discipline distinct from the civil one20. 
                                                          
Religioni: la sfida in una società complessa, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 
22/2018, pp. 5-10; R. MAZZOLA, La convivenza delle regole. Diritto, sicurezza e organizzazioni 
religiose, Milano, Giuffrè, 2005, pp. 38-39.  
19 M.C. FOLLIERO, Laicità e postdemocrazia, in A. Barbera, A. Loiodice, M. Scudiero, P. 
Stanzione (a cura di), Scritti in memoria di Fulvio Fenucci, vol. II, Rubbettino, Soveria 
Mannelli, 2010, p. 170.  
20 The immediate reference is to Islam, where there is no distinction between religious 
community and civil and political society. In fact, as it is known, the Islamic system knows 
only one law, civil and religious at the same time, thus characterizing itself as a monistic 
system. Even more upstream of this, there is the incompatibility of language, so some 
expressions like 'human rights and religious freedom', 'democracy', 'woman's role', 
'monogamous marriage' can have completely different valences compared to those of 
western matrix. Consequently, the Islamic religious phenomenon is suspended between 
social reality and the search for a juridical dimension, faced with the need to regulate the 
discipline of Islamic religious groups in terms not provided for in the Constituent. With 
regard to the new spiritual organizations and the new religious movements, the italian 
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Also the recent round of agreements, activated starting from 2012, 
has confirmed such critical issues, noting that the insistence on the method 
of bilateral collaboration has been originated from a wrong interpretation 
of the public role of the religious phenomenon (far from exhausting in the 
simple dimension of social and institutional importance of the religious 
denominations). A willingness to promote the bilaterally agreed legislation 
which is directly due, on one side, to the persistent actuality of an 
incomplete and chaotic implementation of many constitutional freedoms, 
and, on the other, to the failure to abrogate some laws (such as the cited 
fascist legislation on the ‘admitted cults in the State’) approved in the pre-
republican period. The legislative power has therefore distinguished itself 
for an attitude of inertia and reluctance in the necessary regulation and 
implementation work of the constitutional strategies, preferring to delegate 
to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court the adoption of the more 
significant changes for the affirmation of social and religious pluralism21.  
 
 
3 - Constitutional project of ecclesiastical politics and cultural resistance 
to a correct interpretation of the fundamental provisions of freedom 
 
The new democracy, affirmed after the phase of the fascist dictatorship, 
should have profoundly innovated the scheme of the relations between 
                                                          
legislator is considerably delayed in the work of conferring to them a status adapted to 
their specific characteristics; this is due to the fact that we are dealing with a regulatory 
framework, also a very valuable one, but developed in years when the current reality was 
completely unpredictable. See G.B. VARNIER, Libertà, sicurezza e dialogo culturale come 
coordinate del rapporto tra Islam e occidente, in G.B. Varnier (ed.), La coesistenza religiosa: nuova 
sfida per lo Stato laico, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2008, pp. 53-56.  
21 The current reality is that of an incorrect interpretation of the constitutional precepts, 
well represented by the disruption of the bilateral instrument; a stalemate that is essentially 
imputable to the incapacity of the italian political class in dealing with and managing the 
issues underlying the demands for religious freedom. For the non-Catholic denominations, 
the recourse to agreements with the State has been the only legal means by which they 
could escape the compliance with the rules approved in 1929. The consequence has been a 
substantial flop of bilateral legislation in considering the necessary specificity of individual 
legal relationships that have been created. A failure due, on the one hand, to the stubborn 
immobilism of the legislator and, on the other, to the inadequacy of the 'agreement with 
the Catholic Church/agrrements with the other religious groups' parallelism, envisioned 
by the Constituent Assembly for a historical period much less complex than the present 
one. See P. CONSORTI, La libertà religiosa fra democrazia bloccata e globalizzazione, in M. 
Parisi (ed.), Per una disciplina democratica delle libertà di pensiero e di religione: metodi e 
contenuti, Arti Grafiche La Regione, Ripalimosani (CB), 2014, pp. 54-55.  
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citizens and public powers, in all social relationships, including those of a 
religious nature. 
As it has been mentioned, in the articles 19 and 20 of the Constitution, 
the religious phenomena are the subject of a general discipline, which 
identifies the right of profession of religious faith as a specification of an 
inviolable right of human person22, disciplining it in a manner that is 
perfectly consistent with the model of rights and freedoms that regulate 
relations between citizens and public powers. 
These principles set the broader and more democratic project of 
religious freedom that the Country has ever had, referring both to 
individuals and to social religious groups of any nature, consistency and 
rootedness in our society. Those constitutional legal regulations guarantee 
both citizens and their religious organizations, and prohibit public 
institutions to make any form of discriminatory or restrictive intervention 
on fundamental freedoms, which would be assured to all in the same way.  
Despite this, concretely, after 1948, the art. 7 of the Fundamental 
Charter, intended for the general regulation of the juridical condition of the 
Church of Rome, has become the key to the constitutional discipline of 
religious phenomena, also influencing the normative regulation of the 
                                                          
22 It is worth remembering that the most important aspect of the new democracy is 
constituted by the fact that religious freedom, both in its personal and collective 
dimensions, is recognized as an inviolable right of the human person. Indeed, it has already 
been pointed out that religiosity is appreciated by the State system as a human behavior 
having a propulsive force, which contributes to the promotion of the person and to the 
material and spiritual progress of society. In this sense, the Italian Constitution recognizes 
that the religious denominations have a special function (of civil and social nature), 
considering them to be fundamental instruments of growth and integration of the social 
members in the general framework of the political community of the State. The 
confessional organizations are fully part of the social formations and they constitute 
particular aggregations in which, and through which, the individual realizes the spiritual 
dimension of his personality, making use of them for the purpose of meeting the needs 
connected to the profession of faith religious. It should always be reiterated that our 
Constitutional Charter enhances the public role of religious confessions, only because, 
alongside and in a complementary way to other social institutions, they are considered to 
contribute - in a qualitative way - to the affirmation and integral growth of the person 
human. Performing a particular formative function that projects them in the public sphere, 
the religious communities are able to offer a significant contribution to the spiritual 
progress of civil society (article 4 of the Constitution), through the construction of the 
foundations of values of the political community and the pursuit of some of the axiological 
objectives indicated by the same constitutional text. See M. PARISI, Diritti della persona e 
libertà religiosa, in Annali Univ. Molise, 18/2017, pp. 53-56: V. TOZZI, La libertà religiosa in 
Italia e nella prospettiva europea, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 35/2014, pp. 14-
15.  
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status of other religions. Confronted with an increasingly multireligious 
and multicultural society, today's architecture of ecclesiastical relations has 
confirmed its selective and discriminatory characterization. As already 
argued, the juridical condition and the prerogatives of the Catholic Church, 
of the endowed religions with agreement with the State, of the religious 
groups belonging to the so called 'admitted cults' and of those that have the 
form of associations of common law have clearly been differentiated23. Thus 
determining the need for clarifications regarding the category 'religious 
confession', introduced by the Constituent, also in order to better 
understand the effects deriving from its recognition24.  
These uncertainties are due to the political and juridical limit 
constituted by a particular arrangement of relations between the State and 
the Catholic Church, which has determined a highly unbalanced situation. 
For this reason, the articles 19 and 20 (which are implementing the 
fundamental right of religious freedom, both for individuals and for 
religious organizations) and the articles 8 and 7 (which constitute the sub-
system of relations between the State and the most relevant collective 
religious organizations) have never had a coordinated implementation.  
As said before, in 1984, the Catholic Church and the italian State have 
signed an agreement in order to revise the 1929 Concordat; the goal should 
have been to make the adjustment of those relations to the democratic form 
assumed by Italy since 1948. Only after this, it has been given an initial 
implementation to the agreements with some minority religious 
organizations, that is to say the most historically known ones in Italy 
                                                          
23 See G. RIVETTI, Islam-Occidente. Nuove identità religiose, in G. Rivetti, P. Picozza (ed.), 
Religione, cultura e diritto tra globale e locale, Giuffrè, Milano, 2007, pp. 89-90.  
24 The term 'religious confession' has been used in the italian legal system, for the first 
time, with the creation of the first paragraph of article 8 of the Republican Constitution, 
without, however, specifying what should be understood with it. In paragraph two of the 
same article 8, a reference was made to 'religious confessions other than Catholicism'. In 
this way, the Constituent Assembly wanted to consider the Catholic Church as a religious 
confession, using it as a model to package the new category of collective religious subjects. 
Consequently, the doctrine has deduced that the topical form of religious organizations 
with complex structures, social follow-up and historical-cultural roots in the Italian society 
is legally considered 'religious confession'. With article 8, it has been tried to assure to the 
other religions a juridical regime in some way corresponding to that guaranteed to the 
Catholic Church from the article 7, referring to the Lateran Pacts. See A. MANTINEO, 
Associazioni religiose e “nuovi movimenti” religiosi alla prova del diritto comune in Italia e del 
diritto comunitario, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., October 2009, pp. 1-5; V. 
TOZZI, Le confessioni prive d’intesa non esistono, in Aequitas sive Deus. Studi in onore di 
Rinaldo Bertolino, vol. II, Giappichelli, Torino, 2011, pp. 1033-1034.  
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(Waldensians, Jewish Communities, Pentecostals, etc.), being discretely 
selected and identified as religious denominations. Only a few religious 
organizations, using the instrument of agreements provided for in 
paragraph III of art. 8 of the Constitution, have received concessions and 
guarantees that are similar to those enjoyed by the Catholic Church. The 
season of agreements with some minority religious denominations has had 
inconstant developments, according to the changing political will of the 
governments to meet the needs of the other religious groups, and it has 
shown its function of covering (in a political way) the privileges granted to 
the Church of Rome25. Moreover, the extension of some benefits also to the 
minority religious groups has been used more in order to brake, from a 
cultural point of view, the massive immigration from countries of islamic 
culture than with the aim of giving life to a full and open confessional 
pluralism26. 
With the 2001 constitutional reform (by constitutional law of October 
18, 2001, no. 3), the method of preservation of the authoritarian model of 
regulation of the religious freedoms was further stiffened. This law 
establishes the exclusive competence of the Government in matters of 
standardization in the relations between religious confessions and the 
central State (article 117, paragraph 2, letter "c"), in perfect counter-trend 
with the structure of the public powers which, since 1970, has progressively 
strengthened the system of local powers (Regions, Provinces, 
Municipalities, Mountain Communities). The centralization of legislative 
power in this area is in conflict with the fact that most of the interventions 
for the promotion of religious needs are ensured through regional laws and 
administrative acts of the Municipalities or other local authorities. The 
                                                          
25 The benefits enjoyed by the Catholic Church are, above all, of a fiscal and economic 
nature. It could be enough to think about the enjoyment of the share of eight per thousand 
Irpef, through which the Church of Rome annually receives about one billion euros of State 
funding. In fact, it would be really desirable that, finally, we could get a system that, 
avoiding unreasonable discrimination and privileges, can facilitate: 1) all initiatives of 
solidarity, both social and humanitarian; 2) the peculiar ethical-religious and cultic 
activities of any spiritual order; 3) non-commercial and culturally oriented initiatives, that 
is, lived on the basis of both religious and ethical-political orientation. This evolution 
should take concrete form on the basis of a secular interpretation and application of the 
constitutional principles of equality and subsidiarity. See F. FRENI, La libertà religiosa tra 
solidarietà e pluralismo. Analisi e proposte sul modello di laicità «all’italiana», Jovene Editore, 
Napoli, 2013, pp. 78-80.  
26 F. ALICINO, The Universal Constitutionalism in an Age of Religious Diversity. Western 
Secularism Tested by “New” Cultural Conflicts, in F. Alicino, F. Botti (ed.), I diritti cultural-
religiosi dall’Africa all’Europa, Giappichelli, Torino, 2012, pp. 300-302.  
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religious assistance, the financing of religious buildings, the religiously 
oriented social assistance and the charity activities, the private education 
and the protection of some cultural assets of religious interest are all areas 
of social life whose protection and development are predominantly 
entrusted to local authorities, regardless of whether they have a contractual 
origin between religious denominations and the State or if they are 
provided for by laws of common law. 
Faced with these obvious difficulties in the full implementation of 
the constitutional precepts, a large part of the secular doctrine in Italy 
requires the enactment of a general law on religious freedoms. The pursued 
objective would be to get a source of common law, which can translate the 
principles of the Constitution into practice, applying them to the needs of 
the contemporary society, preserving the necessary flexibility for the 
adaptations that may be required by the social changes. This law should 
coordinate the general protection of religious freedoms, both individual 
and collective ones, as foreseen by the constitutional project, without 
directly affecting the negotiated law between the State and the religious 
denominations. That is, it should only indicate the general lines of the 
system, so as to highlight the privileged aspects established in the 
contracted legislation. The work to be carried out could affect the 
interpretation of the rules contracted by the religious groups with the State, 
in order to better regulate the scope of their freedom, limiting it in the 
perspective of adapting their specific structures to the common legislation27. 
The new model of relations between the State and the confessional 
communities should go beyond the perspective of a relationship between 
powers (civil and religious ones), rediscovering the value and the meaning 
of the Republic as a place of coexistence of different subjects and different 
communities28.  
                                                          
27 With reference to the function of the bilateral cooperation system in the framework 
of the Republican Charter, it is a shared opinion, also in light of a relevant line of the 
constitutional jurisprudence, that all the agreements of the State with the religious 
denominations are preordained to perform two tasks. First of all, that of ensuring the civil 
effectiveness, under the agreed conditions, of acts and provisions of the ecclesiastical 
authorities, where the parties agree that they (in whole or in part) do not they belong 
exclusively to the religious order, and / or granting particular advantages, especially in 
the tax area. Then, that of guaranteeing the equal freedom and at the same time the 
protection of the specific features of a religious denomination, respecting the neutrality of 
the State with regard to all collective experiences of faith. See G. CASUSCELLI, Una 
disciplina-quadro delle libertà di religione: perché, oggi più di prima, urge “provare e riprovare” a 
mettere al sicuro la pace religiosa, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 26/2017, p. 21. 
28 G. DAMMACCO, Il diritto ecclesiastico tra riformismo e multiculturalismo, in M. 
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The law, which is hoped for a swift adoption by the Parliament, 
should implement the individual and collective religious freedom in the 
light of equality and solidarity. With a good national organic law, also on 
the basis of European Community law and international treaties in force, 
the revaluation of the articles 19 and 20 of the Constitution could finally 
take place, in a logic of freedom from the conditioning being exercised by 
the relationships between the State and the religious denominations. 
Essentially, the framework law on religious freedoms should fulfill the 
obligation, first scientific and then political one, to identify the limits of the 
matter of relations between the State and the religious groups to be 
regulated by bilateral agreements. In fact, the requirements of protection of 
the religious denominations are, at least, in a condition of parity with those 
of protection of individuals and groups, and with the general principle of 
the promotion of the human person29.  
In short, only in this way, the principle of equality can be more 
strictly observed, avoiding the tendency to favor only the strongest 
confessional groups and those being capable of a decisive unitary social 
presence. Moving from the need to prepare the instruments for the 
implementation of individual and collective religious freedoms in the 
secular and pluralist Charter project, this law should focus on the clear 
enunciation of the general rules, suitable to guarantee a minimum level of 
equal rights in religious matters. So as not to limit such a guarantee only to 
the most influential organizations, and not to exclude the individuals or the 
less organized religious social formations. In fact, many religious groups do 
not have an organizational structure like that of the Catholic Church. In 
many cases, the groups, spread in the Italian territories, recognize 
themselves for the community of faith, but deny any hierarchical or 
dependency relationship with each other. The most current example of this 
problem is constituted by the groups of Islamic culture. To impose on them 
the obligation to have a unitary representation or a single coordinating 
religious organism means to estrange them from their history and reality30. 
                                                          
Tedeschi (ed.), Il riformismo legislativo in diritto ecclesiastico e canonico, cit., p. 174.  
29 M. PARISI, Uguaglianza nella diversità. Identità religiose e democrazia costituzionale, in 
Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 19/2018, p. 9.  
30 The reference is to some recent initiatives of a governmental nature, aimed at devising 
the relations with the Muslim cult, which, in addition to not fully respecting the specificity 
and the internal variety of this spiritual current, propose solutions that deviate from the 
existing constitutional system. In fact, the establishment of an 'Islamic Council', the 
adoption of the 'Charter of Values, Citizenship and Integration', the signing of a 
'Declaration of intent for the federation of Italian Islam' are all attempts that, in addition to 
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For groups of followers of the Islamic faith there is the impossibility of 
structuring as a religious denomination, in the sense attributed to this term 
by the Constitution. At the most, some forms of religious associations on a 
national basis or of geographical-cultural areas or interpretive strands of the 
Koranic tradition can be realized (Sunnis, Shiites, Salafis, etc.); these would 
however remain without religious hierarchical structures, unlike what 
happens for the spiritual organizations of Christian origin31. 
Thus, also to truly guarantee the needs of the new citizens of 
heterodox religious faith, the primary objective of the juridical discipline of 
religious freedoms must be that of guaranteeing to individuals and to all 
the collective subjects to which individuals give life (to their organizations), 
the freedoms as a whole. That is to say, the freedom of thought, of 
conscience, of faith, of adhering and withdrawing from a group, of 
manifesting the faith or of not being forced to manifest it. This perspective 
should redefine the role of all the subjects, both individual and collective 
ones, of all the organizations of the religious phenomenon present in the 
institutional space, in a more respectful manner of the principle of equality, 
without distinction of ideal contents or geo-politic belongings.  
Nevertheless, it is precisely this perspective that prevents the 
adoption of such a legislative provision, especially due to the absurd fears 
for the maintenance of public order32 and to the resistance of the 
                                                          
assuming the appearance of problematic measures in terms of internal sources, generate 
the suspicion of being scarcely operational in terms of integration of the involved religious 
groups. We are faced with the effort of a heterodirect institutionalization of the italian 
Islam, that is detrimental to the organizational autonomy of confessional organizations and 
unwelcome by the islamic world itself, as demonstrated by the explicit refusal of some 
Muslim association movements. A resistance that is expressive of the deep and persistent 
divisions within the italian islamic associationism, and from which it is possible to get the 
perception of the strong difficulties encountered for the attainment of an islamic unity in 
our country. See G. CASUSCELLI, La libertà religiosa alla prova dell’Islam: la peste 
dell’intolleranza, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., July 2008, pp. 3-8; F. ALICINO, 
Costituzionalismo e diritto europeo delle religioni, Cedam, Padova, 2011, pp. 85-89.  
31 A.S. MANCUSO, La presenza islamica in Italia: forme di organizzazione, profili 
problematici e rapporti con le istituzioni, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 32/2012, 
p. 8.  
32 Unfortunately today, the multicultural coexistence is mainly perceived by the 
legislator as a problem of public order. So that the Parliament has started to address these 
issues in a logic of defense, aimed at satisfying the need for security that would emerge 
from the population, even sacrificing more important legal principles and affecting the 
guarantee of subjective rights. Thus, the protection of human rights seemed to be fading, 
on the basis of a strong insistence on distinguishing between regular and irregular 
foreigners. The latter are considered illegal immigrants, with the implementation of a 
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confessional lobbying33. Under this profile, all the political parties that are 
represented in the Italian Parliament do not dare to produce this law, in fear 
of losing the possible electoral support of the Catholic Church or of its 
peripheral organizations. In the democratic game, it is obvious that the 
Church tries to direct the legislator towards the approval of the measures 
that it considers best, as well as trying to dissuade Parliament from 
adopting unwelcome laws. What is unacceptable is the inertia of political 
forces in launching a law that could support and realize religious and ideal 
                                                          
defensive legal scheme in which the recognition of freedoms is subordinated to the degree 
of the achieved collective security. This thanks to an increasingly strict discipline of entry 
and residence in the national territory (in the logic of the closed number), to a constant 
reference to the government of migration policies (based on the parameter of the permit 
linked to the employment relationship), to the abandonment of real integration policies 
(realized only for the benefit of the hypothetically branded immigration as 'good' one). See 
P. CONSORTI, Pacchetto sicurezza e fattore religioso, in Aequitas sive Deus. Studi in onore di 
Rinaldo Bertolino, vol. I, cit., pp. 727-730.  
33 There is little doubt about the existence of a situation of conflict between the Catholic 
Church and the democratic system, as demonstrated by the phenomenon of 'inverted 
separatism', for which only in theory the ecclesiastical authority seems to support the 
autonomy and separation of the civil and religious systems. Concretely, the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy demands its realization only for the religious order, exerting all its force of 
pressure in order to direct the choices of the State, so as to bend them and to make them 
conform to its doctrine. The Church willingly accepts the opportunities offered by the 
democratic form of the State, taking advantage of its values and taking advantage of its 
limits, trying to exploit its problematic aspects and inserting itself into the transformation 
processes, collaborating with the State when it is convenient and demanding separation 
when it intends to defend its principles or to support its own interests (not always strictly 
religious ones). In this the Church maintains an ambiguous attitude and, almost waiting 
for a historical revenge, it tends to structure its organization and its activity in function of 
competition and conflictuality. In particular, the catholic ecclesiastical hierarchies are 
distinguished by frequent interventions in italian political affairs, with such assiduousness 
that they constitute a constant in the history of the democratic institutions of our country. 
This occurs, above all, on the occasion of the electoral deadlines, the referendums or on the 
occasion of the approval of some laws; in these cases, the Catholic Church deems it 
appropriate to intervene in political competition to offer its own orientation in the 
democratic selection between the values of religious ethics and those of secular ethics, 
convinced of the necessity of its contribution in the construction of the social organization 
and in the elaboration of political decisions. From the Church's point of view, this 'new' 
model of presence in public life would find explicit recognition in the interpretation of art. 
1 of the 1984 Concordat, which attributes to the ecclesiastical institution a role of 'mutual 
cooperation' with the State 'for the promotion of the human person and the good of the 
country'. See L. ZANNOTTI, La sana democrazia. Verità della Chiesa e principi dello Stato, 
Giappichelli, Torino, 2005, pp. 77-83; V. TOZZI, Società multiculturale, autonomia 
confessionale e questione della sovranità, in V. Tozzi (ed.), Integrazione europea e società 
multiculturale. Nuove dimensioni della libertà religiosa, Giappichelli, Torino, pp. 154-155.  
 22 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 32 del 2018 ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
pluralism, in full conformity with the constitutional dictate34. The 
'normative silence' (imputable both to the Parliament and to the 
Government) produces the result of delaying beyond measure the repeal of 
obsolete legislative disciplines, of fueling uncertainty (allowing the 
continuous jurisprudential recall to outdated principles and rules), of 
preventing the formation of a coherent common law that should represent 
the parameter of the constitutional legitimacy of each differentiated 
discipline, of allowing the continuation of favorable treatments for the 
Catholic Church (postponing the constitutional implementation in sensitive 
sectors)35. 
It should not be forgotten that the secular State is not indifferent to 
religions, although it does not ignore its difficult relationship with the 
various spiritual orientations and, at the same time, the difficulty of the 
relations of the various religions among them. Precisely, in order to remain 
impartial and equidistant, the secular State can never express preference for 
a fideistic orientation, but it is required to assume an ecclesiastical policy 
committed to promoting religious and cultural confrontation. The function 
of the secular and democratic State is to guarantee the conditions for the 
coexistence of the various ideal conceptions against the prevalence of 
                                                          
34 It would be really desirable for the political forces to react to the pressure exerted by 
the ecclesiastical hierarchy, claiming their autonomy and recalling the principle of 
secularism of the State. The obligation of an impartial political practice, subtracted from 
the influence exerted by religious beliefs and institutions, constitutes the true litmus test of 
a secular and democratic system. Unfortunately, the perceived threat of a weakening of the 
country's traditional cultural identity, hypothetically determined by the multiplicity of the 
faiths and of the ideal orientations present in contemporary society, has meant that the 
Catholic Church has been assigned the role of interpreter of the 'natural law' and guardian 
of 'healthy traditional values'. In this way, it has emphasized the public projection of 
Catholicism, encouraging the approval of normative choices designed to downsize the 
principle of non-identification and neutrality. See M.C. FOLLIERO, Multiculturalismo e 
aconfessionalità: versioni attenuate dei principi di pluralismo e laicità, in A. Fuccillo (ed.), 
Multireligiosità e reazione giuridica, cit., pp. 134-136 
35 It should not be forgotten, then, that the regulatory gaps dilate the discretion of the 
Public Administration, which fills the spaces by measures inspired by contingent political 
choices, sometimes in open violation of the principle of impartiality, which should govern 
it, and of the principles of neutrality and equidistance, which are at the heart of democratic 
secularism. The legislative inaction constitutes a violation of the responsibility of the State 
in its task of protecting minorities, identifying in advance, and in compliance with the 
principle of equality, the timing, the modalities, the procedures and the limits of 
promotional measures in favor of the freedoms of minority individuals and groups. See G. 
CASUSCELLI, Diritto ecclesiastico ed attuazione costituzionale tra deformazione e proliferazione 
delle fonti, in M. Tedeschi (ed.), Il riformismo legislativo in diritto ecclesiastico e canonico, cit., 
pp. 237-240.  
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fundamentalisms. Nevertheless, the public institutions must also represent 
themselves as the engine and the summarizing place for the cultural and 
political competition that takes place in society. The fundamental task of the 
secular and democratic State is, today more than ever, the social integration, 
so as to allow cultural and religious diversities - without exclusions and 
without prizes - to be related to each other and to be involved in the public 
debate on the guidelines for the best political action36. 
In this way, to guarantee the full realization of cultural and 
confessional pluralism, it is necessary to abandon any conservative strategy 
that aims to evade or circumvent the central theme of the freedom of 
religion as a right of all individuals and of the equal freedom as a right of 
all the religious denominations. The safeguarding of constitutional 
legitimacy requires restoring a priority position to the common law, 
favoring its maximum expansion, as a guarantee of the renewed centrality 
of the principles of equality and non-identification37. The hope is that the 
minimum content of a plural and secular democracy could be finally 
achieved. Through a correct application, in a secular and democratic sense, 
of the constitutional requirements, it would be possible for the individuals 
as well as the ethical-religious communities to live their specific cultural 
project, thanks to equal opportunities for enjoying all the basic rights and 
freedoms. In this way, it would be achieved the desired outcome of a legal 
organization of civil cohabitation characterized as respectful for the rights 
of all (believers and non-believers)38. The compromise between ideologies, 
                                                          
36 L. ZANNOTTI, La politica ecclesiastica nel tempo della secolarizzazione e del 
multiculturalismo, in N. Fiorita, D. Loprieno (ed.), La libertà di manifestazione del pensiero e la 
libertà religiosa nelle società multiculturali, Firenze University Press, Firenze, 2009, pp. 280-
281.  
37 On this point see R.M. DOMIANELLO, Libertà religiosa tra bilateralità necessaria, diffusa 
e impropria, in A. Fuccillo (ed.), Le proiezioni civili delle religioni tra libertà e bilateralità. Modelli 
di disciplina giuridica, cit., pp. 52-53, which highlights the need to work simultaneously on 
three fronts. The first is that of a secularization of the common laws, which can take care 
of, on an unilateral basis, the constitutional duty to effectively satisfy the rights of all, and 
not only the interests of the strongest ones. The second front is constituted by the necessity 
of a unilateral revision of the legislation inherited from the fascist period, so that, filling in 
content the principles of religious pluralism and the equal freedom of all confessional 
organizations before the law, it may rise to the rank of interposed source. The third front, 
finally, is that of a development and a permanent update of the laws produced (directly 
and indirectly) in a bilateral way, in order to ensure that they are reasonably packaged only 
to guarantee the particular specificity of a confessional group or of a unique stock of 
religious denominations.  
38 This is the goal and, at the same time, the way of being of contemporary multicultural 
and multireligious democracy, which is concerned with opening up the society, of which 
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wisely achieved in the Constituent Assembly, must be constantly pursued 
over time, by means of a continuous hermeneutical updating of the Charter 
and of its secular application39. Only in this way, the structural principles of 
freedom, in the current multireligious society, could widen and extend to 
the weaker components of the social body which, overcoming the 
experienced situations of marginality, could be put in condition of 
acquiring a full citizenship of rights. That is to say, a not only formal, but, 
above all, a substantial enjoyment of the fundamental rights.  
 
                                                          
it is an expression, to heterodox cultures and religions. This type of democracy welcomes 
foreigners not only as a mere workforce, but as resources that, paradoxically, expand the 
basic culture and the traditional religion. The effort, therefore, is to combine equality and 
differences, knowledge and enhancement of all religious and areligious cultures, including 
them in a communicative democracy on the basis of the full enjoyment of individual and 
collective guarantees of freedom. See N. COLAIANNI, Tra eguaglianza e differenza: i diritti 
cultural-religiosi, in F. Alicino, F. Botti (ed.), I diritti cultural-religiosi dall’Africa all’Europa, cit., 
p. 24.  
39 In the objective of the realization of a 'practice concordance', achievable by conceiving 
the legal system as a place of equilibrium between formal law and religious identity, 
between authority and individual conscience. See R. MAZZOLA, La convivenza delle regole, 
cit., p. 37.  
